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Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to clarify and discuss the various ways firms can make workforce reductions. This aim is 
accomplished by an in-depth study of an historical case; the downsizing process undertaken in the 1920s by the 
Swedish Tobacco Monopoly, a state-owned company that had to balance between rational business conduct and 
social responsibility. The paper makes use of qualitative sources, such as board minutes and memos, and a 
database covering all blue-collar workers in one of the company’s factories. The paper adresses conceptual 
questions concerning how to theoretically and empirically distinguish between various reduction strategies and 
tactics. Its main contribution is to move beyond the simple characterization of reductions as being either smooth 
or harsh and instead emphasize the multitude of management choices involved in reducing headcount and, 
consequently, the diversity of downsizing processes. 
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Introduction 
The past decades have seen a wave of downsizing sweeping over the world. This trend has 
inspired many studies on the consequences of reductions: for redundant workers, survivors, 
organizations and whole communities.1 Yet, few researchers have systematically discussed 
the variety of ways through which reductions may be achieved, and little interest has been 
devoted to downsizing as a process experienced by individual companies.2 Although scholars 
in the fields of management research and industrial relations have made some attempts to 
discern patterns in recent decades, conceptual and explanatory frameworks for studying 
workforce reductions in general are poorly articulated.3 Although the variety of possible 
workforce reduction strategies is sometimes acknowledged, little theoretical work has been 
devoted to conceptually distinguishing strategies and to explaining why some are used and 
others are not. This is surprising since firms’ choices of how to downsize potentially have 
great consequences for their own performance in the future, as well as for the overall 
functioning of labour markets.4  
Empirically, research on contemporary downsizing is difficult since companies in the 
process of making reductions are usually unwilling to disclose relevant information. So far, 
the theoretical and empirical works on downsizing have left little imprint in the business 
history literature. Personnel reductions are mentioned in passing but are seldom the main 
object of studies.5 The current state of research is unsatisfactory for several reasons, one being 
that commentators often emphasise that the downsizing wave of the recent decades represents 
something fundamentally new. Such assertions may well be true but are hard to evaluate.  
 The aim of this paper is to clarify and discuss the various ways firms can carry out 
workforce reductions. This is accomplished by an in-depth study of an historical case; the 
                                                 
1 Baumol, Blinder and Wolff, Downsizing in America; DeWitt, “The Structural Consequences of Downsizing,”; 
Parker, Chmiel and Wall, “Work Characteristics and Employee Well-Being,”; Thornhill and Saunders, “The 
Meanings, Consequences and Implications”. 
2 This has  been pointed out by, for example: Art Budros, “The Mean and the Lean,” 308;  Freeman and 
Cameron, “Organizational Downsizing,” 15; White, “The Management of Redundancy,” 39. 
3 Budros, “The Mean and the Lean”; Greenhalgh, Lawrence and Sutton, “Determinants of Work Force 
Reduction Strategies”; McCune, Beatty and Montagno, “Downsizing: Practices in Manufacturing Firms”; 
Sutherland, “Workforce Reduction Strategies”; Turnbull, “Leaner and Possibly Fitter”; Wagar, “Factors 
Affecting Permanent Workforce Reduction”. 
4  Wass, “Who Controls Selection under ‘Voluntary’ Redundancy?”; Turnbull and Wass, “Job Insecurity and 
Labour Market Lemons”. 
5 C. f. Robert Lewis, “The Workplace in Economic Crisis“. 
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downsizing process undertaken by the Swedish Tobacco Monopoly in the 1920s. The 
Tobacco Monopoly was a state-owned company, which meant that reductions were delicate. 
As will be shown, the company came up with a whole reportoire of ways to achieve 
reductions; some of them resemble measures that we see in downsizing companies today.  
The challenges faced by the Swedish Tobacco Monopoly were shared with many other 
producers of tobacco goods worldwide. The fact that smokers abandoned hand-made cigars, 
in favour of cheap, mass-produced cigarettes from the late nineteenth century onwards, gave 
producers of cigars stronger incentives to rationalize production.6 By the end of World War I, 
machines for cigar rolling with substantial labour-saving potential became available and 
eventually replaced manual production in many countries. However, the magnitude and pace 
of the subsequent downsizing process varied. In the United States, for instance, the overall 
loss of jobs was dramatic.7 Between 1921 and 1935, more than 56 000 jobs were eliminated. 
In Spain, where the tobacco industry was run by a chartered company, mechanization was 
smoother.8 Between 1887 and 1945, the female labour force was reduced by 70 percent 
without any layoffs. As will be shown in this paper, the Spanish case contrasts sharply with 
the downsizing of cigar production in Sweden.  
Before looking more closely into how the managers of the Swedish Tobacco Monopoly 
perceived and dealt with redundancies, it is appropriate to introduce the concepts used for 
studying workforce reductions. 
 
Workforce reduction strategies 
There are a number of ways through which a company can respond to oversupply of labour. 
Apart from reducing the number of workers, companies can try to diversify production, 
reduce working hours or wages, just to mention a few options. If the company chooses to 
reduce headcount, which is the focus of this paper, there are basically three strategies: 
attrition, redeployment and layoffs. 
                                                 
6 Cox, The Global Cigarette”; Hannah, “The Whig Fable of American Tobacco”; Zitzewitz, “Competition and 
Long-Run Productivity Growth”. 
7 Baer, The Economic Development of the Cigar Industry; Cooper, Once a Cigar Maker; Creamer and 
Swackhamer, Cigar Makers – After the Layoff; Kaufmann, Challenge and Change; Manning and Byrne, The 
Effects on Women of Changing Conditions. 
8  Gálvez Muñoz, Compañia Arrendataria de Tabacos; Gálvez Muños and Francisco Comin, “Business and 
Government”; Gálvez Muñoz, “Engendering the Experience of Wages”. 
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 Attrition means that management freezes recruitment af new workers and let the 
workforce shrink as old workers leave for various reasons. Freezing new recruitment can be 
more or less effective, depending on the rate of turnover. Management can therefore actively 
try to affect turnover by various tactics, such as buyouts and window plans. Attrition achieved 
by active management measures can be termed induced attrition.   
Redeployment means transfers of labour between units within an organization is not 
necessarily a reduction strategy but can be. When looking at establishment or unit level it is 
reasonable, to include redeployment as a way to reduce headcount, but if the study object is 
an entire organization, transfer of people becomes more of an alternative to workforce 
reductions.   
The meaning of ‘layoffs’ differs between countries and over time. In this paper layoffs 
are defined as terminations of on-going employment contracts without explicit promises of 
return. There are also so called temporary layoffs where workers continue to be formally 
associated with the company. This measure is in essence a temporary reduction of working 
hours, which is an alternative to reducing the number of workers. 
 In the popular debate, reductions are often depicted as either smooth or harsh, 
depending on how the treatment of redundant workers is perceived. The same idea is also 
found in academic research, for example in the typology put forward by Leonard Greenhalgh, 
Anne Lawrence and Robert Sutton.9 Greenhalgh et al. classify reduction strategies according 
to protection of employee well-being, on the one hand, and short-time cost savings, on the 
other hand. Employee well-being  and costs savings are thought of as depending on two 
features: pecuniary compensations and the degree of choice for redundant workers. Layoffs 
with outplacement are thus smoother than layoffs without outplacement. There is also another 
dimension related to employee well-being, which is the degree of choice for redundant 
workers. Attrition, achived by volontary quits are thus classified as a smoother strategy than 
layoffs where management establish the order of selection. 
 It remains to be seen whether the above classifications and definitions are applicable to 
historical contexts.   
After having defined various reduction strategies, the next question is why companies 
apply one strategy before another, or a particular mix of strategies. So far, there is no 
comprehensive theory of the determinants of companies’ workforce reduction strategies. 
Greenhalgh et al. offer a typology where explanatory factors are hierarchically classified, 
                                                 
9 Greenhalgh, Lawrence and Sutton, “Determinants of Work Force Reduction Strategies”. 
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which may serve as a starting point for empirical investigations. Their expectations on how 
the various factors influence the choice of reduction strategy are not formally derived but are 
intuitively based on mainstream economic theory. The two main groups in their typology are 
(1) the context of the oversupply and (2) perceived features of the workforce oversupply. The 
perceived features involve magnitude, duration and predictability. If the identified oversupply 
of workforce (shortage of work) is of small magnitude and short duration, it is more likely 
that management will handle the situation by natural attrition. The greater the magnitude and 
the longer the duration, the more likely it is that the management will choose measures that 
have the potential of greater cost savings. Greater uncertainty (with regard to magnitude and 
duration) is also associated with more radical reduction strategies. 
The contextual variables are further divided into three groups: environmental 
characteristics and organizational characteristics.10 Environmental characteristics include 
ownership structure, company form, unionization and the like. That is, various factors outside 
the organization in question can influence the choice of reduction strategies. Organizational 
characteristics can be global or aggregate. Global characteristics refer to indivisible 
organizational traits, more specifically firm structure (multidivisional or unitary), use of 
temporary workers, level of slack resources, history and value system. Aggregate 
characteristics refer to the workforce; skill level, external demand for skills, mix of general 
and firm-specific skills, age and seniority. In line with human capital theory, Greenhalgh et al. 
argue that management will be more inclined to use layoffs if the employees are unskilled, 
possess few skills that are idiosyncratic to the firm’s production process, in low demand in the 
external labour market, young and with short tenures. Low skill requirements mean low costs 
for training new workers in case of future expansion. If the skills needed are of general nature, 
there may even be a supply of workers ready to take part in the production process on short 
notice. Skill level and skill mix are often related to age and seniority. Young employees with 
short tenures usually acquire lower level and less firm-specific skills. If the demand for 
employees with the type and level of skills needed by the company is low, the potential to use 
natural attrition as a reduction strategy will be weak, since the employees will have few 
alternative employment opportunities.    
The following sections describe how the Swedish Tobacco Monopoly reduced its blue-
collar workforce in the 1920s, starting with the context of the downsizing process, and 
                                                 
10 This distinction is inspired by Katz and Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations and Lawrence and 
Lorsch, Organization and Environment. 
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discussing management perceptions. Thereafter follows a further look into the various 
strategies and tactics used to achieve workforce reductions, and an estimation of the relative 
importance of natural attrition, induced attrition, redeployment and layoffs for the reductions 
at one of the Tobacco Monopoly’s factories. A tentative attempt is made here to explain the 
company’s choice of reduction strategies. The paper is concluded with a summary of the 
theoretical and historical significance of the case study.  
 
The Swedish Tobacco Monopoly – environmental and organizational characteristics 
Production of tobacco goods has been the object of state control and ownership in many 
European countries. In Sweden, the tobacco industry was taken over by a joint-stock company 
with the state as the majority owner in 1915.11 The nationalization was for purely fiscal 
reasons and can be seen against the backdrop of welfare state expansion, the imminent need 
for rearmament and the expansion of the American Tobacco Company. Half of the Tobacco 
Monopoly’s board members, including the chairman and a so-called director on duty, were 
appointed by the state and the other half, including the managing director, by the private 
owners. Hence, the latter group had a significant influence in spite of being minority owners. 
Between 1915 and 1929 the position of managing director was held by Oscar Wallenberg, a 
member of the famous Wallenberg family.  
 The Tobacco Monopoly was surrounded by an institutional framework that aimed to 
strike a balance between profit maximization and social responsibility. On the one hand, the 
business was to be managed efficiently; all opportunities for cost-saving measures were to be 
taken, reflecting that the ultimate purpose of the company was to deliver incomes to the state. 
On the other hand, when deciding to nationalize, the politicians made some concessions to 
those involved in the industry. Interestingly, not only the former factory owners, but also the 
workers made redundant in connection with nationalization, were granted compensation. This 
formal right applied until 1920. The state representatives on the board also had instructions to 
let social considerations shape the personnel policy in other respects. Already at an early 
stage, the Tobacco Monopoly provided a wide variety of welfare services – such as banking 
services, libraries, courses, child care and health insurance. In 1921, the company also 
introduced old age pension for its workers. 
                                                 
11 This section is based on Om tobak i Sverige. 
7 
 
 The Tobacco Monopoly took over some facilities from the previous owners, but tried to 
concentrate production during the first years of its existence. The most important factories 
were located in Stockholm and Malmö, but there were also some establishments in smaller 
locations. The workforce was recruited from the stock of trained workers, and about 80 
percent of the blue-collar workers were women. Until 1918 some workers were hired on a 
temporary basis, but were made permanent the same year. Thus, there was no big stock of 
temporary labour when the downsizing process began. 
 The Tobacco Monopoly ran five distinct branches – cigars (and cigar-cigarettes), snuff, 
rolling-tobacco, smoking-tobacco and cigarettes – each of which was characterized by its own 
production methods and technologies. Whereas machines were used to manufacture snuff and 
cigarettes, cigars and cigar-cigarettes were rolled by hand or with the help of wooden moulds. 
The cigar branch was by far the most important with regard to employment. Female 
dominance was greatest in the preparation process, but there were still some male cigar-
makers. A fairly high share, about 50 percent in cigar production for example, of the workers 
in the tobacco industry could be considered as skilled or semi-skilled. Nationalization meant 
that these skills, at one stroke, went from being industry-specific to firm-specific. The tobacco 
workers’ opportunities in the external labour market were considered poor, particularly since 
many of them were physically weak. Redundant tobacco workers who were involved in direct 
production therefore received much higher severance pay than workers with general skills 
(such as storage and white-collar workers) in the years after nationalization.  
 The tobacco workers belonged to the pioneers of the Swedish labour movement. Their 
organization was open for all occupations and organized a very high share of the workers in 
the industry.12 By 1904 the Tobacco Workers’ Union had already managed to attain a 
collective agreement with national coverage. A later amendment to the collective agreement 
stipulated work sharing instead of layoffs in situations with temporary oversupply of labour. 
The agreement also acknowledged the unions right to appeal against unfair discharges, but 
apart from that, the Tobacco Monopoly did not face any formal restrictions of workforce 
reductions. For instance, the collective agreement in the tobacco industry did not prescribe the 
selection criteria to be used in case of layoffs. 
  
  
                                                 
12 Lindbom and Kuhm, Tobaksarbetarnas förbund. 
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Management perceptions of the need to downsize 
The initial period of the Tobacco Monopoly’s existence was characterized by strong demand 
for tobacco goods. At the end of 1919, the company employed 5,251 blue-collar workers, 
which was a higher number than had ever been recorded in the pre-monopoly era. With 
hindsight it is obvious that this situation was not sustainable in the long run. Demand for 
tobacco products in Sweden was abnormally high in that year and was about to change 
composition. On top of that, cigar production, the most labour-intensive branch, was about to 
be mechanized. Yet, for those involved, the Tobacco Monopoly’s downsizing process was 
characterized, at least initially, by uncertainty, particularly with regard to the development of 
consumer demand. 
 In autumn of 1920 the first signs of a recession were seen. In particular, the demand for 
cigars fell dramatically as consumers switched to cheaper cigar-cigarettes. Stocks increased at 
a worrying pace, but the difficulties experienced by the tobacco industry were not unique. The 
Swedish government’s attempt to re-establish the gold standard made imported goods cheaper 
and put industries exposed to foreign competition under great pressure.13 Although protected 
by a licence fee, domestically produced tobacco goods lost market shares. Another factor was 
that the company lacked expertise in marketing and forecasting and had to rely on the 
judgement of retailers.14 Time after time, sales forecasts proved to be wrong, and although the 
company board was aware of this problem, it did not initiate any systematic work to improve 
forecasts. 
 The negative development continued in 1921, when sales of cigars almost halved. In 
order to stimulate demand for domestically produced cigars, retailers were given discounts 
and sales bonuses.15 At first, this initiative seemed to be a success and the board observed a 
slight increase in the sales of cigars in 1922, but in the following year cigar sales again went 
down.16 Encouraged by the discounts, some retailers had probably bought more cigars than 
needed in 1922. Anyway, the behaviour of the company is interesting as it indicates that the 
management at least hoped that tobacco consumption would recover to the 1919 level.  
 This did not happen. In 1923, sales of tobacco products stabilized at a lower level. 
However, profits were kept high throughout the inter-war period.17 By 1924 the accumulated 
                                                 
13 Schön, Sweden’s Road to Modernity, 246-251. 
14  Om tobak i Sverige, 59-63. 
15 Styrelsens förvaltningsberättelse 1920, AB Svenska Tobaksmonopolet, 24. 
16 Styrelsens förvaltningsberättelse 1922, 22; Styrelsens förvaltningsberättelse 1923 , 17. 
17 Om tobak i Sverige, 70-75, 356. 
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dividends were already higher than the total costs associated with nationalization, and over 
twice the size of the invested capital. Overall, the Swedish tobacco industry was spared from 
the Great Depression. As the currency depreciated there was also a clear trend for foreign 
imports to decrease. By the late 1920s this trend had become so strong that the government 
proposed to lower the taxes on imported cigars, since it was thought that the Tobacco 
Monopoly needed competitive pressure to uphold quality and cost efficiency. 
 Uncertainty also prevailed regarding the potential of the new cigar machines. Already in 
1915, the management was aware of technological advances that had been made in the United 
States, but it hesitated until 1920 before ordering 80 machines. Only six of the machines were 
delivered the same year, but in the annual report it is noted that “... when all machines have 
been installed, the wage bill for cigar manufacturing should be possible to cut considerably”. 
When individual members of the company board brought up hours-reductions as an 
alternative to layoffs in the spring and autumn of 1921, their idea was rejected by 
management representatives. The technical director explained: “With increased machine 
production of cigars the labour demand will undergo a steady decrease”.18 The great scope for 
mechanization was beyond doubt at that time, but the limits of the new technology, and how 
fast it could be implemented, were not known. The management refrained therefore from 
laying off male hand cigar makers in Malmö in the summer of the same year. In the autumn of 
1923 the management established that it would be unwise to release 50 female cigar workers 
currently employed in preparation work, even though there was a surplus of prepared tobacco. 
A memo explained that: 
 
The division of labour is still not fully implemented as it should be. A part of the mechanization of 
work is still awaiting its solution. One therefore cannot yet definitely determine whether these 
workers can be employed in their original jobs.19 
 
In December 1921, a management representative informed the union that “[…] machine 
production was still in an experimental stage and that a definitive decision about future 
acquisition of machines had not been made yet”.20 In order to get more information on the 
                                                 
18 Board minutes, 14 March 1921, Svenska Tobaksmonopolet (STM), Swedish Match’ Archives (SM); Incoming 
correspondence from the Tobacco Monopoly, 15 July 1921, E03: 1, Svenska Tobaksindustriarbetareförbundet 
(STF), Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek (ARAB). 
19 Board minutes, 17 September 1923, Attachment C, “P.M. angående cigarrarbetet”, STM, SM. 
20 Board minutes, 29 December 1921, A02: 5, STF, ARAB. 
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matter the union’s executive committee sent a letter to its sister organization in the United 
States. The reply, which arrived in autumn 1922, was a testimony to technological 
regression.21 After having introduced automatic machines for cigar production before World 
War I, many firms returned to older technology, even to hand and mould work, in the period 
of unemployment after the war. Automatic machines were only used for producing cheap 
grades.  
 The managers of the Swedish Tobacco Monopoly experienced no similar setbacks. By 
the autumn of 1924, about 65 percent of the cigars and 88 percent of the cigar-cigarettes sold 
by the company were machine-made.22 In the past four years, the total wage bill had been cut 
from 17 to 7 percent of the total of gross turnover. Possible doubts about the new technology 
were gone.23 The management saw several advantages of mechanization in addition to its 
labour-saving and deskilling effects; for example better hygiene, more even production, 
greater work discipline, less consumption of raw tobacco, book-keeping, supervision and 
reduced space requirements. Furthermore, the management thought that machines would 
imply greater flexibility, making it possible to adapt production to demand swings.24 By 1928, 
the production of cigar-cigarettes was fully mechanized, but there were still some cigar brands 
that were made by hand.25 Machines for parts of the preparation work were also introduced 
over the course of the decade.26  
   
Dealing with redundancies 
The simultaneous decline of cigar consumption and introduction of labour-saving technology 
led to an oversupply of labour at the Tobacco Monopoly in the beginning of the 1920s. At 
                                                 
21 Cirkular letters, 15 September 1922, F8B: 3, Frans Henrik Kockums tobaksfabrik (FHK), Malmö stadsarkiv 
(MS). 
22 These estimations have been made by combining the information from an internal memo and an annual report. 
Board minutes, 23 September 1924, Attachment E, ”Maskiner”, STM, SM; Styrelsens förvaltningsberättelse 
1924. The degree of mechanization in the Swedish tobacco industry appears to have been comparatively high in 
this phase. Only about 18 percent of the cigars produced in the United States in 1926 were machine-made. 
Cooper, Once a Cigar Maker, 311. 
23 Board minutes, 23 September 1924, Attachment E, ”Maskiner”, STM, SM. 
24 Board minutes, 23 September 1924, Attachment E, ”Maskiner”, STM, SM. 
25 In the annual report for that year the company board noted that, “out of consideration for the employed”, it was 
not possible to reduce the number of cigar workers as much as motivated by the degree of mechanization. 
Styrelsens förvaltningsberättelse 1928, 24. 
26 Om tobak i Sverige, 39. 
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times the management reduced working hours temporarily, but most of the reductions of 
labour inputs by the Tobacco Monopoly were achieved by reducing the number of workers. 
From 1920 to 1921, the blue-collar workforce was cut by about a fifth and the workforce 
continued to shrink until 1927, after which it reached a fairly stable level, as displayed in 
figure 1.27 All the basic reduction strategies identified above were used to achieve the 
reduction in headcount. The following subsections combine evidence from qualitative sources 
and data from the personnel records of  Malmö Cigar Factory. 
 
Figure 1 Number of blue-collar workers at the Swedish Tobacco Monopoly, 1916-1930 
 
Source: Styrelsens förvaltningsberättelse, AB Svenska Tobaksmonopolet, various years. 
  
The factory employed about a third of the workforce in the branch and a fifth of the 
company’s whole workforce at the end of 1920.28 The development of employment at Malmö 
Cigar Factory, shown in Figure 2, was fairly similar to that of the company as a whole. First a 
rapid expansion, with the peak reached at the end of 1919 when the factory employed more 
than 1,200 workers, and thereafter a slight contraction, followed by a major reduction of the 
workforce. The decrease continued at a slower pace until 1927 when more dramatic cuts were 
implemented. By the end of 1928, the number of workers had been reduced by over 60 
percent since 1920.  
                                                 
27 Karlsson, Downsizing. 
28 Styrelsens förvaltningsberättelse 1920, 24.  
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 Figure 2 also relates the stock of workers at Malmö Cigar Factory at the end of each 
year to the flow of workers – hirings and exits. Exits are here defined as all those workers 
who left the company, voluntarily or involuntarily. This figure shows a marked reduction in 
the inflow of workers as the depression began to be felt in 1920. Thereafter the inflow of 
workers was kept at a low level. The outflow of workers was low throughout the whole period 
with the exception of two years: 1921 and 1927.  
 
Figure 2 The workforce at Malmö Cigar Factory – stocks and flows, 1915-1928 
 
Note: Total workforce is measured at the end of each year. The number of exits is inverted to represent the 
outflow of workers. 
Source: Personnel records, D4A: 1-8, FHK, MS. 
 
Natural attrition 
Natural attrition implies that the management does not take any active measures to reduce the 
workforce. In its pure form the management does not replace any employees who leave the 
company. Such an absolute hiring freeze is often hard to sustain in practice if the management 
does not want to shut down production completely, and it is not surprising that the Tobacco 
Monopoly did hire some workers during the period when the workforce was being reduced in 
aggregate terms. Between December 1921 and the end of 1928, 59 workers started at the 
Malmö Cigar Factory. 
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Figure 3 Natural attrition at Malmö Cigar Factory, 1916-1928 
 
Note: Natural attrition in relation to the factory’s workforce at the beginning of each year. Natural attrition 
defined as those workers wholeft the factory due to one of the following reasons: “at own request”, death, 
disability, discipline offence, dismissal (not further specified), old-age retirement (after 1921), no cause stated 
(without severance pay). 
Source: Personnel records, D4A: 1-8, FHK, MS. 
 
Figure 3 shows the gross rate of natural attrition each year during the period 1916 to 1928; 
that is to say, all exits from the factory that could not be classified as induced attrition, 
transfers or layoffs, divided by the workforce in the beginning of each year. As shown, the 
gross rate of natural attrition decreased to levels around 5 percent during the period of 
investigation. 
 Voluntary quits accounted for the most important part of natural attrition from the 
Tobacco Monopoly. In theory, workers’ quit behaviour is related to their attachment to the 
employer, which in turn depends on external employment opportunities and costs associated 
with inter-firm mobility.29 These variables are usually correlated with individual 
characteristics, such as sex, age, tenure and occupation.  Historically, labour markets have 
often been segregated by sex, so that men and women have faced different employment 
opportunities.30 Numerous empirical studies, from various contexts, have shown the 
                                                 
29 Jovanovic, “Matching, Turnover, and Unemployment”; Oi, “Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor”; Parsons, 
“Specific Human Capital”. 
30 Owen, “Gender Differences in Labor Turnover”. 
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importance of age for quit behaviour.31 Young workers are often engaged in ‘job shopping’, 
whereas older workers are less inclined to take the risk of leaving an ongoing employment 
relationship. Another factor of importance is the degree of transferability of skills, usually 
indicated by tenure and/or occupation. Workers with a high degree of firm-specific skills are 
less likely to find attractive employment opportunities than workers with general skills. Most 
likely, all these variables mattered in the case of the Swedish Tobacco Monopoly, since its 
quit rate was comparatively low during the downsizing process. 
 
Figure 4 Quit rate at Malmö Cigar Factory, 1916-1928 
 
Note: Quit rate is here defined as the number of quits “at own request” during each year divided by the 
workforce in the beginning of the year.  
Source: Personnel records, D4A: 1-8, FHK, MS. 
 
The quit rate for male and female workers at Malmö Cigar Factory, illustrated in figure 4, 
approached 9 percent in 1920 for both men and women, but, as the downsizing process began, 
the voluntary turnover decreased and fluctuated around a considerably lower level, 
particularly for men.32 This pattern can be attributed to external as well as internal factors. 
Looking at the external labour market, the Swedish economy experienced a severe downturn 
                                                 
31 C.f. Hamilton and MacKinnon, “Quits and Layoffs”. 
32 As a comparison, it may be mentioned that quit rates among blue-collar workers in the Swedish engineering 
industry exceeded 12 percent most of the years in the 1920s. Before the post-war depression, employers in this 
industry could experience quit rates above 50 percent. Holmlund, Labor Mobility, 25. 
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in 1921-1922.33 Although the economy recovered soon after, unemployment levels remained 
high until the end of the 1930s. Conditions in the male labour market, with its emphasis on 
heavy industry, seem to have been particularly difficult, whereas industries that employed 
many women were less exposed to business cycles. As seen in Figure 4, female tobacco 
workers were generally more inclined to quit ‘at own demand’ than male workers.34 Apart 
from external labour market conditions, this difference indicates the terms on which women 
participated in gainful employment at the time. If duties towards the family required it, female 
workers faced strong pressures to quit. 
 
Induced attrition 
If natural attrition is characterized by management being passive, induced quits indicate that 
management is actively trying to speed up the natural rate of attrition, without forcing workers 
to leave. Both positive and negative inducements can be applied. In the former case, 
management offers some kind of benefit to workers who leave; what is termed ‘buyouts’ 
today. In the latter case, management tries to persuade workers to leave by making things 
worse for them if they stay, for example by threatening with layoffs without outplacement.35 
As will be seen, the demarcation between induced quits and layoffs can be blurry in those 
cases. 
 Apart from speeding up workforce reductions, induced attrition gives managers greater 
possibilities of affecting the composition of the workforce. Since young workers are more 
inclined to quit voluntarily, it is likely that the remaining workforce will have an age structure 
that is unfavourable to the company. Having a high share of old workers is particularly 
unfavourable in times of rapid technological change.36 This was certainly an aspect that 
mattered for the Tobacco Monopoly. Old workers, whose skills were made useless by 
mechanization, were also less able to keep up with the high pace set by the machines and, 
probably, less willing to adapt to the new job content. When making buyouts, the Tobacco 
Monopoly therefore targeted old workers, either by limiting the offers to a particular age 
group or by letting compensation amounts grow with age.37  
                                                 
33 Schön, Sweden’s Road to Modernity. 
34 For evidence pointing in the same direction with regard to manufacturing firms in the United States in the 
1920s, see Owen, “Gender Differences in Labor Turnover”. 
35 Turnbull and Wass, “Job Insecurity,” 37. 
36 Lazear, Personnel Economics for Managers. 
37 Karlsson, Downsizing. 
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 Furthermore, the Tobacco Monopoly often used induced quits and layoffs in 
combination, in the sense that the management announced that the workforce had to be 
reduced by a certain number and that it could take place either by workers volunteering (self-
selection) or by layoffs. This was the procedure in the spring of 1927, when the local factory 
manager openly targeted a particular group; women whose husbands were also employed at 
the factory.38 The same procedure was applied in the autumn the same year.39 However, it was 
difficult for the management to attract enough volunteers in the spring and autumn of 1927. In 
the autumn the management even had to raise the amount offered, not only for those who 
were about to be released but also retroactively for those women who had left in the spring. 
 
Redeployment of labour 
The Tobacco Monopoly was a company whose production was shared by its branches and 
factories around the country. Workers were transferred both between and within 
establishments in the inter-war period, and workers made redundant in connection with plant 
closures were usually offered jobs in another factory and help with the moving. The 
geographical distance between units discouraged workers from moving, but some certainly 
did. In the beginning of 1921, 10 percent of the female workforce under the age of 25 at 
Malmö Cigar Factory had been transferred from another unit within the Tobacco Monopoly, 
mostly from the closed-down factory in nearby Landskrona.40 After the closure of this factory, 
there were few opportunities for short-distance transfers between establishments in southern 
Sweden. As will be seen below, only a very small fraction of the workforce reductions at 
Malmö Cigar Factory was accomplished by transfers. Redeployment may have been more 
important in the Stockholm area, where there were several units belonging to different 
branches. 
  
Layoffs 
Layoffs were an important mean to achieve workforce reductions for the Tobacco Monopoly 
in the 1920s. This reduction strategy was not implemented continuously over time, but was 
concentrated to certain points in time when large numbers of workers were released en masse, 
as shown in figure 5. Over 90 percent of the recorded exits ‘due to shortage of work’ at 
                                                 
38 Board minutes, 26 April 1927, STM, SM. 
39 Board minutes, 17 October 1927, STM, SM. 
40 Karlsson, Downsizing, 302. 
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Malmö Cigar Factory occurred on three dates: 5 April and 4 October 1921 and 25 October 
1927. This pattern, seen in studies of modern data as well, is regarded as a way for managers 
to minimize the negative effects of layoffs on worker morale.41 The idea is that workers are 
more disturbed by facing a more or less constant threat of being laid off than if that risk is 
concentrated to certain occasions. Another explanation is the existence of fixed costs 
associated with negotiations.42 The cost of establishing an order of selection, arranging 
outplacement, negotiating with the union (or handling protests afterwards) and other matters, 
is not much higher for 100 layoffs than it is for10. Employers therefore prefer releasing many 
workers at a time rather than having an even stream of layoffs. 
 The Tobacco Monopoly did not apply a consistent policy when establishing the order of 
selection at layoffs.43 There seems to have been an implicit seniority norm before and in the 
beginning of the downsizing process. In April 1921 the layoffs were concentrated on “the 
youngest and most recently hired”,44 but the principle was abandoned in autumn the same 
year, probably because of technological change. With the introduction of machines, senior 
workers lost their key role in training new workers and thus became less valuable from the 
management’s point of view. In addition, the general situation in the labour market had 
severely weakened the bargaining position of the Tobacco Workers’ Union, which advocated 
seniority as a selection criterion, and the layoffs more often affected middle-aged workers 
after 1921. The workforce was continuously divided according to gender when establishing 
layoff units, with the management not deciding upon how many workers to lay off, but how 
many male and female workers to lay off. Both groups were affected by layoffs, although the 
risk differed between occasions.45 Still, the big gender difference with regard to layoffs 
concerned outplacement.  
  
                                                 
41 Bewley, “A Depressed Labor Market”. 
42 Williamson, “The Economics of Organization”. 
43 Karlsson, “Allocating Job-Losses”. 
44 Board minutes, 18 April 1921, STM, SM. 
45 In 1921 women faced a much higher risk, whereas men were more exposed in 1927. On average, the layoff 
rates were somewhat higher for women than for men (2.2 and 1.7 percent, respectively). 
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Figure 5 Number of layoffs due to shortage of work at Malmö Cigar Factory, 1920-1928 
 
Source: Personnel records, D4A: 1-8, FHK, MS. 
 
In principle, outplacement can take different forms, such as a prolonged notice period, 
severance pay or retraining. The Tobacco Monopoly applied outplacement in all these 
mentioned forms.46 A two-week notice period had been prescribed by the collective 
agreement since the time before monopolization, and workers who were made redundant on 
shorter notice got pecuniary compensation equivalent to two weeks pay. The practice of 
providing outplacement in the form of severance pay had been established in connection with 
monopolization. Formally, tobacco workers made redundant after 1920 had no right to 
benefits, but the Tobacco Monopoly continued to hand out severance pay in the 1920s and 
1930s. According to one official company history, it was “[…] a natural obligation for the 
monopoly management to ameliorate the situation for the dismissed”.47 However, the terms 
differed considerably between occasions and groups. Age was an important determinant of 
outplacement – both with regard to level and form. Older workers were given higher cash 
support extended over longer periods than young workers. Young workers, on the other hand, 
could get access to retraining, either under the auspices of the company or provided by 
someone else. Since most of the young workers were women, and domestic work was seen as 
                                                 
46 Karlsson, “Downsizing, State Ownership”. 
47 Om tobak i Sverige, 69. 
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a promising labour market at the time, the Tobacco Monopoly’s own courses, arranged by the 
personnel consultants, were focused on cooking, sewing and other household duties. Gender 
was generally an important determinant of outplacement. Male workers were generally given 
more generous support than female colleagues, even if the amounts were related to the 
average earnings of men and women, respectively. An even bigger difference was seen 
between workers involved in direct production of tobacco goods and support workers of 
various kinds, such as mechanics. This different treatment was motivated by the greater 
difficulties faced by tobacco workers in the external labour market, since their skills were less 
transferable. 
 
The relative importance of various reduction strategies 
Having established that the Tobacco Monopoly used all of the basic reduction strategies and a 
variety of associated tactics, the task in this section is to assess the importance of the 
respective strategies based on the the personnel records of Malmö Cigar Factory.  
 As seen in table 1, about 6 percent of the personnel forms lacked explicit information on 
the exit reason. If not otherwise indicated, these cases have been regarded as natural attrition. 
Another problem, related to the historical context, is how to regard workers who left the 
factory with old-age pensions or early-retirement benefits. In a modern context the former 
group would be seen as natural attrition, whereas the latter group would most likely be 
regarded as induced attrition. Such classifications would not be correct in this case study. The 
pension scheme was introduced as a way to deal with redundancies in the autumn of 1921. 
Before that point in time, there was no formal age of retirement for the blue-collar workers; 
they were allowed to continue working as long as they were physically capable, although not 
necessarily on the same tasks.48 Those workers who were released with old-age pensions in 
1921 have been classified as layoffs, and workers who retired after that year as attrition. 
Workers released with early-retirement benefits have been treated as layoffs, since these 
individuals were selected by the management and could not choose for themselves whether to 
stay or to go.   
                                                 
48 Although there was a general pension system in Sweden at the time, the compensation amounts in this system 
were hardly high enough to allow complete withdrawal from the labour force. Olsson, Gamla typer ocn nya 
produktionsförhållanden. 
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 As shown in the table, gross attrition and layoffs accounted for the bulk of all exits, 35 
and 51 percent, respectively. About 12 percent of the exits were classified as induced quits, 
whereas redeployment to another factory was insignificant.  
 Had the management imposed an absolute hiring freeze, it would have been enough to 
look at the exits when quantifying the importance of various reduction strategies. However, 
since there was also an inflow of workers to Malmö Cigar Factory, the above figures 
overestimate the importance of natural attrition.  
 
Table 1 Exit reasons at Malmö Cigar Factory, 1920-1928 
 
Note: The category ‘Discipline offence or incompetence’ refers to dismissals due to lack of discipline, 
drunkenness, absence, theft and the like.  
Source: Personnel records, D4A: 1-8, FHK, MS. 
 
After adjusting for the new hires, it can be established that, of the reduction between 
December 1920 and the end of 1928, 55 percent was achieved by layoffs, 31 percent by 
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natural attrition and 13 percent by induced quits. Even if the importance of natural attrition is 
somewhat underestimated, it is clear that the company used layoffs to a great extent. To put 
these figures into perspective, it can be mentioned that the Spanish Tobacco Monopoly 
mechanized its cigar production during the inter-war period without using layoffs at all.49 
 To conclude whether this could actually have been a viable strategy for the Swedish 
Tobacco Monopoly is beyond the scope of this paper, but some tentative notes can be made. 
The downsizing process would certainly have been somewhat more prolonged without 
layoffs. Assuming a rate of natural attrition of 5 percent, it would have taken 14 years, instead 
of the actual 8 years, for the Swedish Tobacco Monopoly to achieve a 50 percent reduction of 
its workforce without using layoffs or induced attrition. Compared with the choosen path, 
downsizing without layoffs would have required higher wage costs.  However, since the total 
wage bill was rather limited in relation to total costs the impact on the overall profit rate 
would not have been dramatic.50 The fact that the management so actively tried to speed up 
the reduction of headcount suggests that it put some emphasis on rational business conduct. 
Social responsibility was not mainly articulated in the form of absolute employment 
protection, but in how redundant workers were compensated. 
 Another question is to explain why the company did not use buyouts to a greater extent. 
After all, the state representatives on the company board had instructions to treat the workers 
with particular care. From the management’s perspective it might well have been welcome to 
avoid the delicate issue of selecting workers for layoffs. One aspect to mention here is that the 
costs associated with large-scale buyouts probably were hard to predict. As mentioned, it was 
difficult for the management to get enough volunteers. Pursuing a more far-reaching buyout 
policy would have considerably improved the bargaining position of the workers. In each 
situation there were probably marginal workers who had considered leaving the company 
anyway and would have happily resigned, even if given only low benefits. But attracting more 
volunteers required higher benefits, particularly since the management had particular 
preferences about the characteristics of these volunteers. With regard to the financial solidity 
of the Tobacco Monopoly, one could argue that increasing costs was not a big problem. Yet, it 
could have been for the company board, which were to approve all forms of compensation 
offered to the workers. Induced attrition were not established practice in early twentieth 
                                                 
49 Gálvez Muñoz and Comin, “Business and Government”. 
50 As mentioned above, the total wage bill was lower than 20 percent already before mechanization of cigar 
production. 
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century Sweden. The Tobacco Monopoly was in that respect a forerunner and it is likely that 
the owners considered wider implications of how the company treated redundant workers. If 
the Tobacco Monopoly, a state-owned model company, offerred compensation for voluntary 
leavers, workers in other industries could be inspired to demand the same.51  
 
Conclusions 
Workforce reductions are often thought of as being either smooth or harsh. This paper moves 
beyond that dichotomy by illuminating the multitude of choices between various reduction 
strategies and tactics. While there are basically three strategies for reducing the number of 
workers, more than one strategy can be applied simultaneously and each strategy can be 
implemented by using a range of tactics, as seen in the case of the Swedish Tobacco 
Monopoly. 
 The case has also shown that the empirical identification of reduction strategies are not 
always clear cut. For instance, the Tobacco Monopoly introduced mandatory retirement of 
workers over a certain age in an early phase of the downsizing process. While exits due to old 
age in present-day labour markets would be seen as natural attrition, the same was not 
obviously the case in inter-war Sweden, where there was no formal retirement age. Another 
observation, probably less specific to the particular context, is the practice of making buyout 
offers under the threat of collective layoffs: if not an enough number of workers volunteer, 
employment contracts will be terminated. Such a strategy is likely to create internal tensions 
among the workers and blur the distinction between voluntary and involuntary measures.  
 With these, and other, conceptual considerations in mind it turned out that the  
The Tobacco Monopoly was a state-owned company with a predominantly female workforce. 
Due to declining cigar consumption and the introduction of new, labour-saving technology, 
the number of workers in Swedish cigar factories was cut by 60 percent from 1920 to 1928. 
Workforce reductions mainly affected permanently employed workers, which meant that the 
company’s social responsibility was put to the test. An investigation of the personnel records 
from one of the company’s cigar factories indicates that layoffs accounted for 55 percent of 
the workforce reductions, natural attrition for 31 percent and induced attrition for 13 percent.  
 Theoretically, the choice of strategies and tactics are shaped by management 
perceptions and contextual variables. For the management of the Tobacco Monopoly the 
                                                 
51 The board was, for instance, careful to differentiate the compensation to redundant workers according to 
whether they were proper tobacco workers or not. See Karlsson, “Downsizing, State Ownership”. 
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incentives created by these variables were sometimes contradictory. Despite some initial 
uncertainty, the management soon realised the potential of technological change. New 
machines for cigar making made it possible to cut the wage bill and decrease the dependence 
on skilled workers. This came into conflict with the moral responsibility associated with state 
ownership and the position as the only employer for tobacco workers in the country. The 
solution became to compensate redundant workers. Some were induced to leave, but most 
redundant workers were not given such a choice. The Swedish Tobacco Monopoly’s heavy 
reliance on layoffs in is striking, particularly if contrasted with the Spanish Tobacco 
Monopoly. Further studies of companies that faced seemingly similar challenges but 
responded differently, would be valuable for increasing our understanding of downsizing, past 
and present. 
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